Divide and Rule: How the Burmese Military Installs Proxy Leaders to Control Ethnic Groups
For decades, Burma (Myanmar)'s military junta—known as the Tatmadaw—has employed a deliberate strategy of divide and conquer to maintain power and control over the country’s diverse ethnic populations. Central to this strategy is the installation and manipulation of proxy leaders within ethnic communities, fracturing internal unity and weakening collective resistance against centralized military rule.
The Karen National Union: A Case Study in Manipulation
The Karen National Union (KNU), one of the oldest and most prominent ethnic resistance groups, offers a compelling example. Historically, the KNU has fought for autonomy and self-determination for the Karen people. However, in recent years, splits within the organization—often tied to factions aligned with the Burmese military—have undermined its unity and effectiveness.
One key moment came after the 2012 ceasefire agreement, when elements within the KNU leadership shifted toward a more conciliatory stance with the Tatmadaw, reportedly under pressure or enticement from the central government. KNU leaders Mutu Say Poe, Kwe Htoo Win, Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win, Saw Roger Khin, and others have been accused of accommodating military-linked economic and political interests, creating deep rifts within the organization. Many frontline commanders and Karen civil society organizations have rejected this leadership, accusing him of undermining the struggle and betraying the Karen cause. This internal division has weakened coordinated resistance and distracted from broader national unity efforts with other ethnic groups.
Profiting from Power: Business Deals for Proxy Leaders
A critical aspect of this strategy has been offering lucrative business opportunities to selected ethnic leaders aligned with the military. These proxy leaders have been granted access to logging contracts, cross-border trade monopolies, real estate deals, and mining rights, often in partnership with military-owned enterprises like Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).
For example, KNU-aligned business elites associated with the military-friendly faction were awarded special business privileges in areas like Hpa-An and Myawaddy, including tax collection rights at border checkpoints and trade routes connecting to Thailand. These deals not only enrich the proxy leaders but create patronage networks that ensure loyalty to the central government.
Similar arrangements have been documented among leaders in Karenni, Kachin, Mon, and Rakhine regions, where select individuals have gained wealth and power through opaque deals tied to natural resources, development projects, and military-backed companies—often while their communities face displacement, land grabs, or violent crackdowns.
COVID-19 Funds Misused by Proxy Leaders
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Burmese military and aligned ethnic leaders received millions in emergency relief funding—from both internal sources and international humanitarian agencies. However, a significant portion of this aid never reached the people most in need, especially in conflict-affected ethnic areas.
In some regions under ceasefire or BGF (Border Guard Force) control, funds meant for COVID testing, food security, and PPE distribution were hoarded or siphoned off by proxy leaders, who used the crisis to consolidate power and bolster personal wealth. Entire communities in Karen and Kachin regions reported receiving no pandemic aid, even as their designated leaders claimed relief budgets were being used effectively.
According to local NGOs and civil society watchdogs, over $10 million in aid designated for ethnic border areas during 2020–2021 remains unaccounted for, with little transparency or oversight. Military-linked ethnic elites used this period to strengthen their influence, while ordinary villagers were left to face the pandemic with no resources, overwhelmed clinics, and food shortages.
Divide and Conquer Across Ethnic Lines
The Karenni (Kayah) people have experienced similar tactics. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) faces ongoing threats of fragmentation due to infiltration and pressure from military-backed actors, particularly in areas where development projects like hydropower dams and mining intersect with military interests. By co-opting certain local leaders through economic incentives, the Tatmadaw has effectively neutralized resistance in strategic regions.
The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) has also been a target. Though once a powerful armed resistance group, divisions within the Kachin leadership—often instigated through backdoor deals and co-opted ceasefire agreements—have created uncertainty. In some cases, splinter groups have emerged that are suspected of receiving covert military support, muddying the political waters and weakening the KIO's control over its traditional areas.
The Mon and Chin ethnic groups, while smaller in population, have similarly been manipulated. Military-linked parties have historically supported rival political factions or community leaders, fueling ethnic rivalries and creating artificial disputes to fracture solidarity. For example, in Mon State, military-linked business interests have worked closely with certain local leaders to suppress protests and land claims.
In Arakan (Rakhine State), where the Arakan Army (AA) has grown rapidly in strength, the military initially tried to divide the Rakhine political movements by empowering the Arakan National Party (ANP), which was more willing to engage with the central government. Although the AA has gained credibility among local people for its armed resistance and governance, the presence of pro-military politicians and community influencers continues to pose a threat to unified Rakhine aspirations.
Mechanisms of Military Control
The Tatmadaw employs a wide array of tools to install and sustain proxy leaders, including:
Ceasefire and development agreements
Threats and targeted assassinations
Promotion of religious and ethnic divisions
Border Guard Force (BGF) system
Strategic economic incentives
Emergency crisis funding and aid manipulation
These tools are part of a long-term agenda: keep ethnic groups fractured and fighting each other, so they cannot effectively unite against centralized military control or push for federalism.
Consequences for National Unity and Peace
The result of these divide-and-rule strategies has been a fractured ethnic resistance landscape, with trust eroded among different groups and even within the same group. The dream of a united federal democratic Burma has been repeatedly delayed, not just by overt military oppression but also by deliberate manipulation of community leadership.
Ethnic civil society organizations, religious leaders, and youth movements are increasingly calling for internal reforms and grassroots-led representation, arguing that true leadership must be chosen by the people—not appointed through backdoor deals with the military.
Conclusion
The Burmese military’s long-standing strategy of installing proxy leaders within ethnic communities is a key pillar of its oppressive governance. From the Karen to the Kachin, from the Mon to the Arakanese, these tactics continue to sow discord and weaken the potential for national reconciliation. Recognizing and dismantling these mechanisms is essential for achieving lasting peace and genuine federal democracy in Burma.
References
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG).
Burma News International (BNI).
International Crisis Group.
Human Rights Watch.
The Irrawaddy.
Frontier Myanmar.
ALTSEAN Burma.
Myanmar Peace Monitor Reports.
UN OCHA COVID-19 Aid Distribution Reports (2020–2021).
Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN) – COVID-19 field updates.
